Skunks, bogies, silent hounds, and the flying fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964

2008 February 13

Below, you may find a resume about this document. For the whole document you may check: http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/relea00012.pdf

The gulf of Tonkin incidents of 2 to 4 August 1964 have come to loom over the subsequent American engagement in Indochina. The incidents, principally the second one of August, led to the approval of the gulf of Tonkin Resolution by the U.S Congress, which handed President Johnson the carte blanche charter he had wanted for future intervention in Southeast Asia. From this point on, the American policy and programs would dominate the course of the Indochina War. At the height of the American involvement, over a half million U.S soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines would be stationed there. The War would spread across the border into Cambodia and escalate in Laos. Thailand assumed a greater importance as abase for supporting the military effort, especially for the air war, but also for SIGINT purposes of intercept and direction finding.

At the time, the gulf of Tonkin incidents of August were not quite so controversial. According to the Johnson administration, the issue of the attacks was pretty much cut and dried. As the administration explained, our ships had been in international waters – anywhere from fifty to eighty miles from the DRV coastline by some calculations, during the alleged second attack – and were attacked twice, even though they were innocent of any bellicose gestures directed at North Vietnam. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had assured the Senate that there had been no connection between what the U.S Navy was doing and any aggressive operations by the South Vietnamese. Washington claimed that the United States had to defend itself and guarantee freedom of navigation on the high seas.

However, within the government, the events of 4 August were never that clear. Even as the last flare fizzled in the dark waters of the South China Sea on that August night, there were conflicting narratives and interpretations of what had happened. James Stockdale, then a navy pilot at the scene, who had "the best seat in the house from which to detect boats," saw nothing. "No boats," he would later write, "no boat wakes, no ricochets off boats, no boats impacts, no torpedo wakes – nothing but black sea American firepower." The commander of the Maddox task force, Captain John J. Herrick, was not entirely certain what had transpired. (Captain Herrick actually was the commander of the destroyer division to which the Maddox belonged. For this mission, he was aboard as the on-site commander.)Hours after the incident, he would radio the Commander-in-chief, Pacific (CINPAC) telling them that he was doubtful of many aspects of the "attack".

It would be years before any evidence that an attack had not happened finally emerged in the public domain, and even then , most reluctantly. Yet, remarkably, some of the major participants in the event still maintained that the gulf of Tonkin incident had occurred just as it had been originally reported. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, in his memoirs of retrospect, considered the overall evidence for an attack still convincing. The U.S Navy's history of the Vietnam Conflict, written by Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald (hereafter referred to a the "Marolda-Fitzgerald history "), reported that the evidence for the second attack, especially from intelligence, including a small amount of SIGINT, was considered conclusive.

In the countries of the south-Eastern Asia, first of all in Vietnam, grows stronger the response on the report of the Us National Security Agency, which was taken off the security list in the end of 2005. In the particular, this report disclosed some details concerning the Tonkin incident of 05.08.1964; wich gave rise to American aggression against Vietnam. This report also admits that the information about the” insidious attack" of North Vietnamese boats against Us Navy destroyers has been fabricated by American secret services and used by Washington to justify its invasion that was announced as "act of self-defense and fair punishment". Experts notice that recent events in the Strait of Hormuz with participation of American and Iranian military sailors favored the actualization of this document after 2 years past since it publishing.

As a matter of fact the NSA's report has just confirmed the all-known fact that Washington uses everywhere tactics of provocation, lies and investigation to interfere in affairs of sovereign states. This report brightened up only one episode in series of countless bloody intrigues of American secret services. Being so remote in time, the above-mentioned events could have not drawn attention of the general public, but for their obvious similarity with USA's current actions in the Middle East.
As well as more than 40 years ago facts forged by American secret services gave cause for Washington's aggression against Iraq.  And as well as then crimes committed by the US Administration against sovereign Iraqi state, which caused deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, were not duly legally evaluated neither in the USA nor in the international organizations.

Only glaring impunity can explain the fact that after about half a century Washington tried once again to repeat the "Tonkin Scenario" in order to realize it aggressive plans regarding Iran – this time in the Strait of Hormuz. A video fragment was presented, where Iranian coast guard officers allegedly menaced to attack the US Navy battle ships. A wide response was imparted to this event through the involvement of all resources of the US propaganda engine. Moreover, G. Bush during his visit to Bahrain demonstratively visited the headquarters of the Fifth fleet and listened to the report of its commander K. Cosgriff concerning the incident at the entrance to the Persian Gulf. Besides, the Department of State sent in the official protest note to the MFA of Iran through the Embassy of Switzerland, which represents the interests of the USA in Tehran.

These events show that the methods used by the American since the Vietnamese war haven’t changed. The Iraqi adventure eliminated any doubts in aggressive essence of the White House's Foreign policy. The declaration of the American administration about the "Iranian role" in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Palestine are no longer seen by anybody as proofs of any Iranian menace to the safety of the Persian Gulf states. Even the most loyal American allies have more confidence in Iranian version of the Hormuz incident than in the fragment fabricated in Washington, in which the patrol boat's captain menaces the group of American military ships speaking in broken English usually used by classic villains in Hollywood's block-busters.

The white house propagandistic efforts and anti – Iranian rhetoric used by Bush during his recent Middle Eastern tour, which was revealed after the US intelligence community report having lowered the alert level caused by Iranian nuclear program and useful contacts of M. Elbaradei in Tehran, witness that the US administration seriously seeks any pretext to continue pressing on Iran up to the use of military means. The Americans seem not really concerned by the matter that the anti-Iranian adventure they plan having as background Israel's impunity in occupied territories and violations by Tel – Aviv of the nuclear weapons non proliferation treaty regime will inevitably lead to a catastrophe in the region and in the whole word. Its scale will far exceed the consequences of the long – standing Tonkin incident.